Conflict Structural Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) - Zambia

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Acknowledgement
This Structural Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) was made possible by generous technical and financial support from the United Nations Development Programme Support to Electoral Cycle project in Zambia. It was carried out by two Consultants namely; Tunji Namaiko and Oita Etyang, who are experts in peace and security issues. The assessment received immense institutional and technical support from the Commission, ECZ Legal Department and members of the National Conflict Management Committee (NCMC). There are various individuals and institutions that provided the much-needed information and support for this assessment exercise that can all not be mention here, but are very much appreciated.
Executive Summary
The study sought to understand the structural factors to conflict in Zambia. Specifically, the study was aimed at (1) identifying structural causes and potential triggers of conflict (2) identifying actors in conflict and their specific roles (3) finding entry points for programming and policy intervention. To achieve these objectives the study used a participatory approach that included a focus group discussion with array of respondents in 10 provinces. Another key element of the approach has been interviews with key informants on thematic areas.

Main Findings
The results of this study show that militarization of political party cadres is a structural problem that cause conflict especially during elections period. The study stablished that political leaders used party cadres to cause violence during party conventions or during political rallies. Violence orchestrated by party cadres has led to death and destruction of properties. The study established that some party cadres operate like a military wing, with distinct uniform and function. Some carry weapons such as machetes, knives and even guns. The study was informed that the militant nature of the cadres makes them to be feared by police officers. The problem of cadreism is further compounded by drug abuse. The study established that majority of the cadre’s abuse drugs (mainly cannabis and alcohol) the abuse of drugs triggers their engagement in violent conflict especially during elections period. 90 percent of the respondents underscored the fact that party cadres have caused electoral violence in Zambia. Poverty, lack of employment and easy money that comes with being a cadre makes cadreism attractive.

Unemployment was another structural factor linked to violent conflict in Zambia. Statistically, unemployment was pegged at 7.4 percent. Whereas the percentage may seem negligible, this study considers the percentage significant as compared to the total population. The study established that unemployment was pronounced in urban areas as compared to rural areas. In urban areas, it was more prevalent in compounds (slum areas). Unemployment especially among the youths enhances their vulnerability and involvement in violent conflicts. The study established a nexus between unemployment
and thieving, violent riots and political hooliganism. Respondents noted that a majority of party cadres who engage in violent conflict are unemployed.

The study established that regionalism and negative ethnicity was emerging as a structural factor to conflict. Despite the fact that they are not fully pronounced, the study noted that politicians were mobilizing on the basis of regionalism/ethnicity during election period. Political parties as currently constituted reflected regional/ethnic inclination. A perfunctory look at the 2016 presidential election pattern, the study concludes that regionalism/ethnicity is taking root in Zambia electoral politics. According respondents, regionalism/ethnicity is emerging due to perceived political and economic exclusion of certain regions/ethnic groups. If not addressed, ethnicity will be a major source of conflict during elections.

Institutions play a critical role in fostering peace in democracies. However, the study noted that Zambia is characterized by weak institutions especially political parties. The study established that political parties in Zambia are devoid of ideology, and lack internal party democracy. The study further established that parties are in most cases characterized by leadership wrangles and fragmentation. These factors have led to violent confrontation among party members. The study noted that the situation is more prevalent during electioneering period.

The study established that retrogressive cultural practices contributed to conflict at family level. The patriarchal nature of the Zambian society exacerbated the problem. Respondents reported increased cases of domestic violence especially in rural and slum areas, economic exploitation of women, women being beaten and coerced into sex. Whereas this is not a political issue, its prevalence is a source of concern and priority if Zambia is to build a robust peace architecture.

Hate speech, ferrying of cadres, elections, selective application of the Public Order Act were cited as triggers to conflict in Zambia. The study noted that the youth were the main perpetrators of violent conflict. Their demographic majority, poverty and unemployment
made them susceptible to conflict acts. Other conflict actors who play a role in accelerating or decelerating conflict in Zambia include: politicians, conflict management committees, churches, traditional chiefs, police and civil society organizations.

**Recommendations**

Based on the findings, the following is a summary of recommendations. Detailed recommendations and an implementation matrix are proffered as the last section of this report:

- **Strengthening conflict management committees**: The committees that were instituted in 2001 have been in the forefront in managing electoral conflicts. However, their mandate and funding has been limited overtime. Therefore, there is need for capacity building in their newly added mandate of conflict prevention. Budgetary allocation to the committees should also be enhanced. It should be noted that this is the only formal mechanism for conflict management in Zambia and needs a lot of investment.

- **Reactivate the political liaison committee**: Political liaison committees are important in peace-building and conflict prevention during election period. Whereas the committee is established in Zambia, its role has been ad-hoc and disjointed. There is therefore, the need to revamp the role of the committee in promoting harmony, trust, and confidence among stakeholders in electoral process. This will contribute significantly to conflict prevention.

- **Implementation of robust fiscal policies**: These policies should mainly target women and the youth who are in most cases vulnerable to conflict. The polices should be geared towards addressing issues of perceived marginalization, poverty and unemployment. The government and donor community should make deliberate and concerted efforts towards these areas as a means of addressing the identified structural factors to conflict.

- **Institutionalization of political parties**: As noted in the findings, political parties lack succinct ideologies. Therefore, there is need to reorient the make-up of political parties in Zambia. Programs aimed at strengthening the organization, structure and functions of political parties should be
established as a means of strengthening political parties. Strengthening political parties will contribute to peace, stability and democratization.

- **Encourage public dialogue**, social exchange programs and peace education in schools. This will enhance the efficacy of grass-root conflict management and resolution.

- **Sensitization**: Need to sensitize the traditional leaders, police, political party leaders and party cadres on their role in conflict prevention and management.

- **Address hate speech**: Being a trigger of conflict, there is need to have stiff punishment for perpetrators of hate speech especially politicians.

- **Address the emerging gender dimension of Conflict**: programs aimed at addressing gender based violence need to be established more specifically in rural and slum areas where the vice is prevalent. The program may include psycho-social services, counseling and reporting of cases. The gender based violence desks in police stations need to be reactivated and revitalized to function optimally.

- **Building National Infrastructure for Peace (IfP) for dealing with all types of conflict, including emerging security threats through a well elaborated National Peace Architecture anchored on a sound National Peace Policy.**

- **Insider Mediation within the framework of NCMC**: Set-up a small panel of **Insider Mediators** for preventive/shuttle diplomacy to build consensus on critical electoral matters. This would support the work of good office of the Chairperson of the Commission as a preventive diplomacy tool.

- **A key overall recommendation to co-operating partners and ECZ is to consider designing an integrated approach to the next election cycle project in order to deal with all these aspects strengthen collaboration of key actors and allow for a multi-stakeholder approach.**
SECTION ONE: BACKGROUND TO THE STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT (SVA)

1.1 Overview of Key SVA Concepts

Structural Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) seeks to diagnose potential sources of conflict and instability of a country by analyzing the profile, causes, dynamics and actors, as well as delineate possible factors contributing to peace. To accomplish this objective, a structural vulnerability framework is used to capture actors, linkages and synergies at various levels of analysis: local, national, regional and global in order to identify and describe root causes and driving forces and to distinguish them from exacerbating factors and trigger events. Furthermore, the structural vulnerability framework seeks to describe and analyze the socio-political profile of a country or region in question within which the conflict plays out, the structural causes, proximate conditions and triggers, and identifies actors that cause the eruption, escalation, protractedness and/or de-escalation of violent conflict. Some of the risk factors are endogenous, others are regional, and still others have an international dimension.

The degree of vulnerability is assessed by the ability to which a community and/or country can adequately respond and manage the risk factors, contain violence and to re-build the socio-economic fabric. The resulting analysis would generate baseline conflict data against which comparative changes can be measured or assessed in order help policy makers to identify risks, prioritize them in terms of susceptibility and determine the adequacy of a particular community to effectively and sustainably manage those risks. To understand a given conflict situation, it is imperative to identify potential and existing conflict causes as well as potential factors contributing to peace. Conflict causes can be defined as those factors which contribute to people’s grievances. These can be further broken down into structural causes, proximate causes and triggers.
1.1.1 Structural Causes of Conflict
Conflicts develop and later escalate as a result of root or systemic causes that are rooted in the socio-economic and political history of a particular society. According to Clark\(^1\), they are underlying conditions, structures and systems that have existed for many years, and are mostly static or change slowly over time, and so form the basis for long-term risk assessment: the probability that a conflict will occur at some time in the next several years or decades, provides for the need for preventive peace-building or peace-making initiatives and long-term planning. Structural factors in most cases tend to be embedded in historical/cultural and institutional contexts such as unequal integration in the global political economy, multi-ethnic or sectarian conflicts, political and economic marginalization, long-standing border disputes, and poverty among others. For purposes of description and analysis, root causes are thus necessary but not sufficient causes for conflict escalation. They however, create the fertile conditions that make a country or region ripe for conflict. In most cases the structural factors are instrumentalized by political actors, thus, leading to violent conflicts.

1.1.2 Proximate Causes of Conflict
Conflicts in society can further escalate due to proximate causes. These refer to medium term conditions and emerging socio-economic trends. Potential crisis at this stage may be identified through tracking dynamic factors or accelerators which may exacerbate the underlying conditions, driving up tensions. Together with root causes they can create sufficient conditions for conflict.

1.1.3 Triggers of Conflict
These are key acts, events or their anticipation that will set off or escalate a violent conflict. These actions and events can unfold rapidly and provide the basis for dynamic early warnings: indicating the probability of a crisis within the coming months, weeks or

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days. Protracted conflicts also tend to generate new causes (e.g. culture of violence and impunity etc), which help to prolong them further.

**Figure 1: Examples of Conflict Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Accelerators</th>
<th>Dynamic Accelerators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Marginalization</td>
<td>Party nominations, electoral fraud, hate speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Inequality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Structure of the country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Recent violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Environmental degradation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Minority regression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Decelerators</th>
<th>Dynamic Deceleration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Economic growth</td>
<td>- National dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Democratic institution</td>
<td>- Mediation Sessions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- History of peace</td>
<td>- Suspension of campaigns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Democratic elections</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1.1.4 Actors

Structural Vulnerability Assessment (SVA) interrogates the role of actors. Actors refer to all those engaged in or being affected by conflict. This included individuals, groups and institutions contributing to conflict or being affected by it in a positive or negative manner, as well as those engaged in dealing with conflict. Actors differ as to their goals and interests, their positions, capacities to realize their goals and interests, and their relations to other actors. SVA analysis, therefore, seeks to explain how root causes of the conflict shape the motivation and the construction of the actors’ actions and expectations. Equally importantly, attention should be paid to peace spoilers, that is, specific groups
with an interest in the maintenance of the negative status quo. This would include groups benefiting from the war economy such as "imperialists, plunderers, warlords, gunrunners, drug-barons and such other predatory actors…that tend to thrive in relatively anarchic environments". Above all, it is important to identify existing institutional capacities for peace, in order to further define entry points to address causes of violent conflict. Capacities for peace typically refer to institutions, organizations, mechanisms and procedures in a society for dealing with conflict and differences of interests.

1.2 Goal and Objectives of the Study

The overall goal of conducting an SVA is to identify the root causes of conflict, triggers and actors for effective policy development and programming in order to contribute to conflict prevention and reduction in Zambia. The specific objectives include:

I. Identifying structural causes and potential triggers of conflict
II. Identify actors in conflict, their specific roles
III. Identify entry points for programming and policy intervention

Seven qualitative indicators served as the primary categories for establishing the causes and potential remedies of conflict. These are:

I. Governance and political institutions
II. The role of civil society
III. The security sector
IV. Social and ethnic relations
V. Economic structure and performance
VI. Natural resources and national development

1.3 Study Questions
In conducting the SVA, specific attention was given to the following questions:

1. What is the context and issues of the conflict? What is the history of the conflict? Which areas are specifically affected?
2. Who are the main actors in the conflict? Who are the main actors in the political, security, economic, socio-cultural, legal and environmental spheres? What are their goals and interests? How do they relate to one another? How can they support peace or further the conflict?
3. What are the major causes of conflict? What underlying factors in the society create the preconditions for violence? What other factors contribute to violence?
4. What are the dynamics of the conflict? What have been the stages and patterns, and what are the current and past trends? How are these evolving over time? Are there windows of opportunity for peace?

1.4 Methodology
The study relied on secondary and primary data sources. Secondary data was gathered from government and international reports, academic publications and information from mainstream media. The literature was critical in identifying gaps and entry points for enriching the report. The literature reviewed was of conceptual and practical relevance to each of the thematic areas identified.

The study was conducted between August and September 2017. The primary data was collected through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The FGDs was appropriate method of collecting data for the study in that it allowed the participants to freely discuss conflict issues that affect them directly. It allowed the consultants the latitude to probe for more information. The participants for the study were drawn from 10 provinces namely: Luapula, Northern, Muchinga, North-western, Eastern, Copperbelt, Central, Lusaka, Southern and Western. Due to financial constraints, a total of nine (9) focus group discussions with an average of ten (10) respondents each were organized. In total 90 respondents were involved in the study. To ensure representativeness, the sample size
included respondents from women groups/movements, youth groups, police, judiciary, faith based organizations, civil society and representatives from District Conflict Management Committees (DCMCs). The focus group discussions were supplemented by key informant interviews.
SECTION TWO: UNDERSTANDING ZAMBIA COUNTRY PROFILE

2.1 Background
SVA for Zambia identifies conflict dynamics and actors, with specific attention to: structural and institutional features of conflict in the country; linkages between security, economy, traditional society and political processes; current and potential impact of poverty to conflict dynamics and the impact of governments’ strategies in this regard. Qualitatively, this study also looks at governance and political institutions, economic structure and performance, resources and national development, social and ethnic relations as well as some external factors. The premise of this study is that the structural architecture within a society may provide a fertile ground for conflicts. Such conditions may include a history of state repression, exclusionary ideologies, increasing population pressures, dramatic economic decline, high levels of disparities among demographic groups, and low and worsening levels of human development. This section lays the foundation for understanding the structural factors through historical analysis.

2.2 Historical foundations of peace and stability in Zambia
Unlike many of its neighbours, Zambian political history has been relatively stable since it gained independence in 1964. Despite a number of failed attempts by the military to overthrow the government, conflicts have generally been resolved through non-violent means, mostly through the courts, whose decisions are generally accepted. Zambia gained independence on 24th October 1964 under President Kenneth Kaunda, a nationalist leader who had fought against the colonial Federation of Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (Malawi). A brief coalition between Kaunda’s United National Independence Party (UNIP) and Harry Nkumbula’s African National Congress (ANC) had collapsed in 1963 with the former subsequently winning an outright victory in the elections that followed. In the 1960s and 1970s, Zambia was instrumental in the liberation struggles in neighbouring countries, for which it paid a high price in the form of reprisal raids by Rhodesian, South African and Portuguese

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forces. In 1972, Kaunda instituted a one-party state, barring multiparty politics for the next two decades. It was perceived that his support base was not stable enough to withstand opposition.

In the 1970s, the regional instability and economic crisis resulting from Zambian attempts, among others, to isolate South Africa’s apartheid regime as well as plunging world copper prices in the mid-1970s led to increased borrowing that left Zambia with one of the world’s highest rates of debt per capita. The state-controlled economy deteriorated, as Kaunda resisted the economic reforms demanded by international financial institutions. With accelerating economic decline came the intensified criticisms of Kaunda’s government by business and trade unions. Following a failed coup attempt by disgruntled members of the Zambian army and Katangese rebels in 1980, as well as a series of strikes in 1981, the economic situation deteriorated further, with the government seeking IMF assistance. Though such assistance was forthcoming, it did not solve Zambia’s problems. In fact, IMF policies exacerbated the crisis. The removal of the maize subsidy, in particular, provoked riots and led the government to eventually abandon their partnership with the IMF in 1987 to implement its own (ultimately unsuccessful) economic recovery programme.

As one of the early ‘casualties’ of the multiparty wave that swept through parts of Africa in the 1990s, Kaunda eventually bowed to domestic and international pressure for democratic reform and lifted the ban on opposition parties in December 1990. After 27 years in power, Kaunda and his party lost the 1991 presidential and parliamentary elections to a broad-based opposition coalition, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by former trade unionist Frederick Chiluba. The MMD government instantly embraced donor-advised structural adjustment programmes entailing, among others, a comprehensive privatisation programme. In a bid to secure power, the Chiluba government in 1996 proceeded to amend the constitution, which weakened the powers of the judiciary and effectively excluded Kaunda from contesting the elections by imposing new requirements on persons seeking to hold the office of president, namely that the person be a Zambian citizen born to Zambian parents. Kaunda’s parents were Malawian. The new constitution was vigorously challenged by opposition parties as well as civil
society and six opposition parties, among them the United National Independence Party (UNIP), who subsequently boycotted the November, 1996 general election, resulting in the re-election of the MMD and Chiluba.

An attempted coup in 1997 led to the imposition of a state of emergency, with the arrest and detention of senior politicians including Kaunda. During the two legislative periods of Frederick Chiluba’s presidency, the culture of authoritarian rule and neo-patrimonial governance persisted. After a decade in power, tension with Western donors over mounting corruption and a problematic human rights record led to an aid freeze, and Chiluba’s attempt at a third term was thwarted by an unprecedented coalition of civil society groups, opposition parties and senior members of his own party. Levy Mwanawasa, a former lawyer and one of the early leaders of the MMD, was picked by Chiluba to run as the party’s candidate in the 2001 ballot. He won narrowly in a poll condemned as flawed by international monitors. On assuming power, Mwanawasa launched an anti-corruption probe that targeted Chiluba and senior members of his former administration, winning the backing of Western donors and a measure of local popular applause (he declared his government to be ‘a government of laws, not of men’). Mwanawasa faced an election challenge in 2006 from former MMD stalwart and populist politician Michael Sata, who performed well in Lusaka and the Copperbelt but fared poorly among rural voters. The latter subsequently accused the MMD of rigging the result. Despite three attempted coups - all unsuccessful - Zambia has escaped the civil wars that have scarred its neighbours.

Political violence, and unrest briefly flared in October, 2006 in the capital, Lusaka, and the Copperbelt, the country’s economic hub, when Mwanawasa was declared the victor in a close-run poll as well as in the 2011 elections that brought Michael Sata to power. Patronage politics has played a key role in Zambia’s successive Governments since independence to date. Whether the system of patronage will persist remains to be seen.
2.3 Emerging Conflict Trends

However, Zambia's positioning in terms of consolidating democracy and peace is being undermined by various socio-economic, political and cultural factors. There is generally growing political intolerance and violence among competing political parties as cadres and their parties are becoming more militarised. The period preceding the past election witnessed growing violent clashes between main rival parties. A cursory look at Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) indicate that the number of conflict events have been on the rise between 2012–2016. This can be summarized in figure 2:1 below:

*Figure 2:1 Conflict Events in Zambia and number of fatalities 2012 -2017*

Source: Computed from ACLED Data.
Using 2016 ACLED data the study concludes that conflict incidences have most been prevalent in the Copperbelt, Central, Lusaka and Southern provinces. One reason for this is high unemployment and service delivery issues are critical in these fairly urban and densely populated areas. This will be discussed in detail the sections to follow below. Suffice to mention that findings indicate that even the fairly peaceful provinces have deep rooted structural issues which should not be ignored. For example, the issue of historical grievances tied to perceived political and economic exclusion appears central and very important in most provinces.

The implication of this is that firstly, the conflict situation could in the long run be triggered along the fault-lines of growing social-economic inequalities, ethnicity and contestation of state control and power by various competing political parties among other factors if the situation is not managed effectively. Secondly, Zambia’s current political stability rests on a fragile foundation, with widespread poverty and glaring violent conflict that occasioned the pre-election period, augmented by incidences of violent post-election clashes all pointing to growing conflict incidences in Zambia and the increasing fragility of peace and security. The fear, uncertainty and lack of party control over cadres has exacerbated the problem. Four lessons are clear about the past elections period:

a) The conflict trends are on the rise in Zambia 
b) There exists a plethora of deep rooted vulnerabilities that act as drivers of conflict that is manifesting in various forms in the country.
c) The country has no clear, pro-active, sustainable and analytical framework for responding to, and managing emerging trends of conflict in a timely manner.
d) The Security architecture in place is best suited to manage traditional security challenges and not emerging trends bordering on human security that feed into traditional security manifestations – often times, the framework appears re-active.
SECTION THREE: THE STUDY FINDINGS

3.1 Zambia Conflicts: Hotspot Areas, Causes, Triggers and Actors

This study examined the structural factors contributing to conflict in Zambia with a view to provoke systemic action that would trigger collective efforts towards peacebuilding. Majority of the respondents (50 percent) that the study interacted with reported that politics especially electoral politics contributed to conflict. According to the respondents, political party leaders and party cadres use violence during electioneering period as a means of achieving their end goals. On the other hand, 30 percent of the respondents attributed conflicts to economic factors (marginalization, poverty and unemployment), 10 percent to cultural factors (chiefdom rivalry, domestic violence) whilst 5 percent attributed causes of conflict to security actors especially the police. It was reported that police selectively apply the Public Order Act which results to conflict between them and political party cadres. This is summarized in figure 3:1 below:

Figure 3:1 Contributors to Conflict

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributors to Conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors Computation
3. 2 Hotspot Districts and Specific Locations
With data obtained from the police, the study with the use of GIS plotted districts that are considered hotspot areas (See page 14). This was based on the electoral related incidences reported to the police during the 2016 general elections. A three-level scale was developed (High, medium, Low). Districts that recorded High and Medium incidences (above 20 incidences) were classified as hotspot districts. Those that recorded medium level of incidences were included premised on the fact that they deserve to be monitored as an early warning initiative. From the GIS map, 30 Districts, out of 60 districts whose data was obtained from the police were classified as hotspot districts. Specific hotspot locations in the identified districts are summarized in the table below:

Table 3:1 Districts and Hotspot Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Location Considered Hotspot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mazabuka</td>
<td>Town Centre, Kabobola, Nakambala and Highlanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Choma</td>
<td>Sinazongwe, Kalomo town centre and Mamba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Namwala</td>
<td>Namwala town,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Luanshya</td>
<td>Roan area, Buteko, Buntungwa, Mikomfwa, Misaka and Mpatamatu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ndola</td>
<td>Mushili, Twapia, Kabushi, Masala and Chipulukusu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mpongwe</td>
<td>Ibenga, Mpongwe town, Kashiba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kalulushi</td>
<td>Buseko, Kabushi and Lulamba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Kitwe</td>
<td>Bulangililo, Chamboli, Chimwemwe, Buchi, Ipusukilo,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kawama, Kwacha, Ndeke and Wusakile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Solwezi</td>
<td>Mushindano area, Kamalamba, Tumvanganai, Shilenda,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Solwezi township and Mukumbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mufumbwe</td>
<td>Chizela, Kalambu, Kamabuta, Kashima west and Matushi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Chilanga</td>
<td>Chimanja, Chilanga Township, Nakachenje, Lusaka west</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>Bauleni, Matero, Kanyama, Mandenvu, Munali(UNZA area),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chawama, Kamwala, Lusaka town centre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Rufunsa</td>
<td>Shikabeta, Rufunsa township, and Bunda Bunda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Kafue</td>
<td>Kasenje, Shabusele, Matanda, Chisankane and Malundu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Shibuyunji</td>
<td>Nampundwe, Milandu and Kalundu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Mulobezi</td>
<td>Sichili, Mulobezi and Nawinda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>Lui, Imwiko, Kanyakyo, Katongo, Yeta, Mongu central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Limulunga</td>
<td>Limulunga, Nangula</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3 Structural Causes of Conflict

Structural causes of conflict in this report are discussed in a thematic format as follows:

3.3.1 Militarization of Party Cadres

Historically, party cadres were considered important in building strong political parties. Cadres who are predominantly young men and women are charged with the responsibility of championing the ideals of political parties. They are considered a link between the party and the masses. They recruit members and ensure that political party values and principles are propagated. In the case of Zambia, cadres have failed to play these functions, on the contrary they perpetuate violence. This study demonstrates the centrality of party cadres in propagating violent conflict especially during elections period. 90 percent of the respondents noted that party cadres have been in the forefront in fomenting electoral conflicts. On 7th September, 2017 for example, PF and UPND cadres engaged in violent conflict in a ward by-election in Chilanga. The violent conflict resulted in many injuries and destruction of property. Sampled areas identified by respondents to have experience conflict orchestrated by party cadres include:

19. Nalolo Lyamakumba, Shekela and Silowana
20. Seseke Mulimambango, Seseke township and Maondo
21. Sioma Mbeta, Sioma and Mutomena
22. Kaoma Mulamatila, Namafulo, Mangango and Mushwala
23. Lukulu Lukulu Township area, and Mwandi

**Eastern Province**

24. Chipata Msanga, Kwenje, Nthope, Dilika, Kanjala, Chipata township area
25. Sinda Sinda, Ching’ombe, Matambazi, Mwangaila and Kapoche
26. Petauke Nyika, Chimanyama, Kaumbwe and Msumbazi
27. Lundazi Mnyamazi, Magodi, Nkhanga, Vuu and Diwa

**Muchinga Province**

28. Shiwan’gandu Shiwangandu township

**Central Province**

29. Kabwe Town centre, Makululu, Mulungushi, Kasanda and Bwacha
30. Kapiri Mposhi Town centre and Tazara

Source Aggregated from Police Data
Table 3:2 Sample of conflict areas involving party cadres in 2016 elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Specific Conflict Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Nchelenge</td>
<td>New and old market in Kashikishi ward, Kambwali and Mukumbwa villages in Kasamba ward, Kasumpa village in Katofyo ward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Chipili</td>
<td>Chipili and mutipula in Nalupember ward, Mwenda village in chibalasha ward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Kasama</td>
<td>Chikumanino market and town centre in Mulilansolo ward, Chambeshi market in Buseko ward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Mansa</td>
<td>In the market area in Muchinka ward, Namwande market in Chilyala ward, Senama market in Kaole ward and in Mwanguni and Matanda villages in Fimpulwe ward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Chadiza</td>
<td>Kumba ward in Mwangala chiefdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Luanshya</td>
<td>Roan area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Solwezi</td>
<td>Mushindano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Livingstone</td>
<td>Limulunya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Mongu</td>
<td>St. John area in Imwiko ward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Gwembe</td>
<td>Kkole ward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Lusaka</td>
<td>In Kanyama, Garden and Chawama</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FGDs in various areas

Respondents noted that the notoriety of party cadres is more prevalent in Patriotic Front (PF) and United Party for National Development (UPND). The violent conflicts orchestrated by the cadres in most cases take the form of assaults, disruption of meetings and armed attacks on perceived opponents. Cadres are known to carry crude weapons such as machetes and pangas. Some even carry guns publicly. It was evident from the study that politicians have always recruited and financed party cadre activities. The ability to make easy money from politicians makes ‘cadre-ism’ attractive. Most youths find refuge in cadre-ism as a way of making easy money from politicians. The study noted that cadres have been used to invade private land leading to violent confrontation. Interestingly, some party cadres operate like security agents, they move around clad in military regalia and provide security to politicians. This has made them ruthless in their actions especially when dealing with perceived opponents. It was reported that some gangs of party cadres, especially from the ruling party are feared by the police. What this implies is that the police cannot take legal actions on party cadres engaged in activities contrary to the law. Respondents further said the rise in this phenomenon, is due to failure by police to effectively provide them and their party officials with security. Party cadres
have also been known to abuse drugs. When asked, which drugs were the most abused, many respondents mentioned marijuana and alcohol. The use of drugs makes them easily irritable at the slightest provocation. The respondents that the study interacted with reported that the drugs instill a sense of bravado that is manifested in violent conflict and leads to gross violation of people’s rights. Suffice to mention that party cadres are the biggest violators of the electoral code of conduct.

3.3.2 Unemployment
The national average unemployment rate in Zambia is estimated at 7.4 percent. The trend indicates that unemployment rate is higher in urban areas as compared to rural areas. Cascaded to the level of province, unemployment data indicate that Copperbelt, Central and Lusaka have the highest rate of unemployment at 12.7 percent, 10 percent and 9.8 percent above the national average. Demographically, average national youth unemployment rate was at 10.5 percent. Higher rates of youth unemployment are recorded in urban areas as compared to the rural areas. Statistics indicate that there are more male persons who are unemployed (12.2 percent) as compared to female persons at 9.1 percent. Copperbelt, Lusaka, Central have the highest percentage of unemployment recorded at 18.2 percent, 14.2 percent and 12.2 percent respectively above the national average. The prevalence of youth unemployment in the Copperbelt, Central and Lusaka provinces may give insights to why the three provinces have recorded high incidences of violent conflicts in the recent past.
The study findings indicate that the high number of youth unemployment is a threat to peace and security. According to the respondents that the study interacted with high levels of unemployment makes the youth susceptible to crime and violent conflicts. The urban youth and those in compounds which are densely populated are the most vulnerable. Cases of theft, violent riots by urban vendors, political hooliganism, and fights and riots at bus stages are attributed to the problem of youth unemployment. According to a police officer, a measurable number of youths have been involved in petty thievery and violence as they lack meaningful forms of livelihood. Social disintegration or fragmentation is also directly correlated with high levels of unemployment. Family break-ups in compounds increase with the trends of unemployment. 70 percent of the respondents argued that most youths are unable to get jobs immediately after finishing school. As a result, majority of the youths relocate to urban centres in search of employment. The urban pressure pushes most of them into crime and violent activities especially during electioneering period. To compound the problem of youth unemployment, many youths do not have finances to start business ventures. Most fail to
secure finances because they lack collateral that is required by banks and other financial institutions.

3.3.3 Regionalism and Ethnic Power Politics
Ethnicity has been defined as the cultural practices and outlooks of a given community of people that set them apart from others. The set of characteristics that are used to often distinguish ethnic groups from one another include language, history or ancestry, religion and styles of dress or adornment. Scholars have emphasized, however, that ethnic differences are wholly learned. Giddens, in particular, has argued that ‘there is nothing innate about ethnicity; it is a purely social phenomenon that is produced or reproduced over time’4. Zambia consists of 73 indigenous ethnic groups in addition to a number of immigrant groups, most of whom are of Asian and European descent. By and large, Zambia has since independence enjoyed stable ethnic relations. Some of the factors that have historically contributed to this include the following:

**Urbanisation:** Zambia is one of the most urbanised African countries in southern Africa. Approximately 40 per cent of the population live in urban areas. This has had a profound impact on the evolution of ethnic relations in Zambia. This urbanisation has perhaps contributed toward mitigating ethnic tensions, with indigenous Zambians living peacefully side by side in the various major towns.

**Kaunda’s One Zambia One Nation Policy:** Kaunda’s deliberate policy of social engineering during the 1980s certainly contributed to the lack of ethnic tensions. The policy contributed to a greater sense of patriotism, oneness and social cohesion.

**Economic Stability of Post-Independence Era:** In the immediate Post-independence era, Zambia enjoyed an economic boom buoyed by high copper prices. Access to wealth and other social economic amenities by most citizens across the country contributed to peace and stability of the country. It by and large defused ethnic undertones. The policy galvanized the different ethnic groups into

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one indivisible and cohesive unit. The policy entrenched the spirit and sense of “We-ness”

However, findings indicate growing threats to ethnic harmony in the country as conflict becomes increasingly manifest. Social-ethnic cleavages are increasingly being featured in most of the conflicts being experienced for the following reasons:

a) Firstly, there is a level of latent resentment of the prosperity of immigrant groups of Asian and East African origin. This has so far manifested in densely populated poor urban areas especially in Lusaka and some parts of the Copperbelt. Some of the reasons for this targeted resentment are poor service delivery and increasing levels of poverty arising from weak economy, and difficulties by citizens to access wealth and other social amenities. If not managed well, there is a danger for politicians to exploit xenophobic sentiments to garner more support for their campaigns and can lead to an escalation of conflict at elections time.

b) Secondly, respondents stated that there is increasing use of negative ethnicity in pursuit of political power. Ethnicity has been politicized by political elites thus sowing division. Formation of regional/ethnic parties, politicizing the formation of electoral and administrative boundaries has exacerbated the problem. Findings show that this trend is alarmingly on the rise and is reflected even in the manner of voting patterns where regions or tribes are mainly voting for candidates who hail from their own tribes and political parties mobilize on the basis of ethnicity/regionalism. A cursory look at the 2016 presidential elections voting pattern, indicate regional/ethnic balkanization of the country. The two main presidential candidates received most votes from their perceived regional/ethnic blocks as the map below shows. This scenario may be a source of conflict in successive elections if not addressed.
Most respondents attributed this problem of ethnicity, regionalism and tribal voting to perceived political and economic exclusion of certain ethnic groups and regions in national processes and unresolved historical issues such as the settlement of the Barotseland Agreement for the case of Western province and inclusiveness of the Government. The inability by policy makers to respond to the challenges of managing a growing multi-ethnic society such as Zambia, poses a huge risk for escalation to crisis stage of the conflict and ultimately disrupt economic and governance process in the country, that include elections.

### 3.3.4 Poverty and Inequality

Poverty and inequality remains a structural issue to conflict in Zambia. It remains pervasive despite the positive trend experienced in the economy in the past few years, with real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of slightly more than 5 percent. The slight improvement in the economy has not translated into improvement of the well-being
of the larger population and poverty remains a structural issue of concern. Recent trends in non-income human development indicators that include literacy, school enrolment, malnutrition, infant mortality, and maternal mortality broadly support the same conclusion. According to a key informant, the stringent economic reforms and the unpredictable weather patterns have increased vulnerability to poverty in most areas in Zambia. According to the Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (LCMS) report released in 2016, the level of poverty at the national level was estimated at 54.4 percent.

The poverty level has predominantly remained high in the rural areas with statistical figures estimated at 76 percent. In terms of geographical distribution, poverty levels are reported to be high in Western province at 82.2 percent, followed by Luapula at 81.1 percent, Northern at 79.7 percent and Eastern at 70 percent. From this figures, we can infer that the discrepancies are due to unequal distribution of resources. This scenario builds a perception of marginalization among the population that if not addressed in the long term may cause conflicts as different groups fend for a living. Majority of the respondents noted that poverty and inequality fomented a growing sense of frustration, hopelessness and helplessness. This state of affairs provides a fertile ground for violent conflict. As noted by a respondent in an FGD session in Kasama:

*People are poor, we feel marginalized, some of the conflicts in our area is due to this thing called poverty. Party cadres engage in violent conflict due to poverty, the youths have no jobs.*

Incidences of poverty seem to be high for female headed households at 56.7 percent as compared to male headed households at 53.8 percent. Stretched further, the LCMS established a correlation between poverty and level of education. According to the LCMS report, poverty in rural and urban areas was high among households headed by individual with no education. What this means is that the level of education attained by a household head tend to reduce the level of household poverty. Poverty was also high in compounds in urban centres. The prevalence of poverty in compounds may explain why violence is prevalent in compounds such as Chibolya, Chawama, Kanyama in Lusaka, Makululu in Kabwe and other shanty compounds of the Copperbelt. It was reported that the poor
economic conditions and low quality of life serve as a breeding ground for conflict especially in high density areas.

*Figure 3:4 Incidences of Poverty per Province*

3.3.5 Weak Institutions

Institutions play a critical role in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts in society. Indeed, the absence of strong institutions to manage conflicts exacerbates the problem. Data gathered from key informant’s interviews and FGDs suggest that weak institutions have contributed to conflict in Zambia. 78 percent of the respondents reported that weak institutions contribute to conflict. Some of the weak institutions that the respondents identified include: political parties, the judiciary, the police and ECZ which is susceptible to external influence which undermines its autonomy.

As regards political parties, respondents noted that political parties in Zambia rarely mobilize on the basis of ideology. They are characterized by leadership struggle. The leadership struggles in Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) and Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) were cited as examples. Respondent observed that
political parties are fragmented with internal factions and lack properly constituted party structures. Furthermore, political parties are centered on individuals, party hopping and ethnicity continue to characterized the parties. Parties also lack internal discipline mechanism. Parties lack internal party tolerance. Party leaders with divergent views are always excommunicated from political parties. Factions within political parties have always led to violent conflicts. In February, 2016 for example, two factions clashed in the MMD party secretariat leading to injuries and destruction of property. Secondly, lack of internal discipline has led to impunity within parties which in most cases culminate into violent conflicts. Party cadres have taken advantage of this situation and are creating havoc and impunity within and outside political parties. The party liaison committee has remained weak and passive in dealing with party matters. Whereas the conflict management committees have been instrumental in dealing with party conflicts during elections, their mandate is limited in scope and they lack sufficient resources to effectively and efficiently deal with conflicts.

Police were accused of abetting impunity perpetuated by party cadres. Respondents reported that in most cases police do not arrest some party cadres who engage in violent activities, especially those from the ruling party. The laxity on the part of the police has contributed to the culture of impunity among party cadres and gross violations of people’s rights. Secondly, police were accused of highhandedness especially when dealing with local communities, specially the opposition members. This has often resulted in violent confrontation between the police and local communities especially the UPND. Violation of people’s rights by the police was cited by respondents and that this acerbates conflict. Thirdly, data gathered through FDGs indicated that police were selectively applying the Public Order Act. Respondents observed that police in many occasion favour the ruling party when it comes to application of the POA. The skewed application of the Act has always resulted in violent confrontation between the police and opposition parties especially UPND.
3.3.6 Retrogressive Culture
Harmful traditional and cultural practices in Zambia have contributed to persistent inequality and conflicts at family levels. Zambia is deeply a patriarchal society where men dominate socio-economic and political spheres of life. Men are generally perceived to be superior over women. Women on the other hand are perceived as weaker and submissive. According to the respondent the study interacted with, this scenario has contributed to gender based violence especially in rural villages and slum (read compounds). Respondents reported increased cases of domestic violence. Respondents reported increased cases of economic exploitation of women, women being beaten, and coerced into sex. It was noted that some of the cases are not reported for fear of victimization. Respondents observed that the cases of domestic violence against women increase during electioneering period. In most case men dictate to their spouses which party to support. The coercion leads to violent confrontations. The problem is further compounded by use of drugs during election period.

3.4 Conflict Triggers
Suffice to note that structural factors on their own do not cause conflict; in most cases, they cross-fertile with triggers to escalate conflict situations. Some of the triggers that were identified include:

3.4.1 Hate Speech
Respondents highlighted the increasing use of incendiary remarks by politicians to fuel conflict. Hate speech remarks bordering on ethnicity and other falsehoods are mostly prevalent during the election period and mostly targeting one ethic group against another; or one individual against another for political mileage. The magnitude of hate speech during political rallies and on social media platforms is worryingly on the rise. Musicians have also been singled out of using derogative language in their music that can easily trigger violence.
3.4.2 Media
Media houses were highlighted as spreading hate speech that trigger conflict especially during elections. Participants indicated that the media, especially public media does give fair coverage and equal access to all political key stakeholders. The public media was especially singled out and perceived to be overly supporting the ruling party and that this does not give an enabling environment for peaceful and credible elections. Participants also expressed worry at the rate the media is practicing conflict-insensitive journalism which dangerously drives conflict.

3.4.3 Ferrying of Cadres
Ferrying of cadres from one area to another is increasingly becoming a common phenomenon during electioneering period. In most cases cadres are ferried from Lusaka to other districts for campaigns. This habit of ferrying cadres always leads to conflict. The situation worsens when cadres are ferried to another parties perceived strong hold. Respondents reported several cases across the country where cadres from Lusaka and Copperbelt were ferried to cause violence especially in rural and semi-rural areas.

3.4.4 Elections
Elections do provide a mechanism for peaceful change and for holding the government accountable to the citizens. However, democratization and elections, most frequently, have seemed to increase the risk of violent conflict in Zambia. The risk of violence is particularly high when inappropriate electoral systems are chosen or when elections are poorly managed. In Zambia, conflicts have increased during election period with violent confrontation between party cadres and the police. This situation is exacerbated when rumors start spreading regarding the electoral process.

3.4.5 Selective Application of the Public Order Act
Respondents reported that the police were selectively applying the provisions of the Public Order Act (POA) that deals with political gatherings. Respondents observed that in most cases the police unliterary cancel opposition scheduled political rallies. This triggers violent confrontation between opposition party cadres and the police. A good
example is the case in Lusaka on 8th, July, 2016 where the cancellation of UPND political campaign rally by the police led to violent conflict leading to the death of one young woman. **This underscores the fact that most women and young people are the victims of violent conflict as they are most vulnerable.** Respondents argued that many of the perpetrators (especially party cadres) who are known for engaging in violent conflicts are under the protection of some police officers. Respondents perceive the police as being corrupt and easily manipulated by party cadres. It was also generally concluded by participants that the police are increasingly using poor methods of policing elections which contribute to escalation of conflicts. **A summary of other triggers can be viewed in appendix 1.**

3.4.6. Traditional Ceremonies
Traditional ceremonies were identified as one possible triggers of conflict in Zambia. The ceremonies have become increasingly politicised and an avenue for political party to engage in party mobilization, promote their identity and show of strength. This often leads to political clashes and conflict between political parties especially, the UPND and ruling PF.

3.5 Conflict Actors
In Zambia, there are different types of actors who either accelerate or decelerate conflict. Among the actors identified during the study include the following:

3.5.1 The Youth
The youth are mainly the group often used to perpetuate violent conflict. Their demographic majority and unemployment makes them susceptible to be used to engage in violent conflicts. As much as they commit arson, maim and kill, they also bear the brunt of the violence. The youth involvement in violent conflict can be attributed to idleness, use of drugs, unemployment and illiteracy. **Conflict is interestingly taking a gender dimension.** In Chibalashi ward for example, respondents reported of the existence of a vicious gang composed of youthful women who are known to organized and engage in violent conflict especially during elections. Suffice to note that most
party cadres are young men, although women are becoming increasingly involved women.

3.5.2 Politicians
Respondents noted that politicians have largely played a negative role in conflict. Politicians spread hate speech which triggers conflict especially during elections. Secondly, politicians fund party cadres who engage in violent conflicts. The many conflicts experienced in the 2016 elections can partly be linked to politicians.

3.5.3 District Conflict Management Committees
Conflict management committees were introduced in Zambia in 2001 as a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism. The rational of introducing the committees is to help ECZ manage election related disputes. The committees are established to promote peace and reconciliation among conflicting parties during electioneering period. The committees are designed in a two-tier architecture that includes the National Conflict Management Committee (NCMC) and the District Conflict Management Committees (DCMC’s). The DCMCs are active in all the 105 districts. The committees comprise of representatives from government agencies, faith based organisations, civil society organisation and political parties that are considered the main stakeholders. In terms of the committees’ functionality, the district committees are mandated to handle local disputes at the lower level before they escalate. The study established that DCMCs have been in the forefront in dealing with conflict at the grass-root levels. The committee have been handling elections related conflicts. However, their mandate and scope of operation is limited. Financial allocations to the committees is also limited thus limiting the functions and operations of the committees.

3.5.4 Churches
The study established that Churches play a big role in resolving conflict in communities. They act as mediators, arbitrators and conciliators between conflicting parties. Some churches have also been instrumental in filling the gap in service provision i.e. provision of health care and education that have been instrumental in addressing some of the
structural factors identified. However, it was noted that some churches are actively involved in partisan politics which leads to deep division and conflict among the followers. There is generally lack of cohesion among different church groupings and as most of them are increasing posturing towards partisan interests which undermines national cohesion. Secondly, some church ministers engage in false political prophesy, the false prophesy becomes a source of conflict among their followers.

3.5.5 Traditional Leaders
The study established that traditional Chiefs have a role in peace and social cohesion especially at community levels. According to the respondents, Chiefs are increasingly getting involved in partisan politics and while at the same time dividing their subjects and the nation on ethnic lines. Respondents indicated that some chiefs have been in the forefront in instigating violence on those considered “outsiders” from their Chiefdoms by inciting the youth. Findings indicate that some Chiefs are also known to propagate hardline political positions that contribute to conflict including influencing intra-party process for adoption of political candidates. Furthermore, respondents alluded of prevalent chiefdom boundary conflicts, chiefdom rivalries between perceived ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ chiefdoms located in the same districts as drivers of conflict. Often, these rivalries take political dimensions during elections and affect the electoral landscape in the area. Some examples of such Chiefdom boundaries and rivalry conflicts chief Mutipula and Mulundu over Musonda falls in Chipili has been a source of conflict. The rivalry between chief Sinazongwe and Mweemba in Southern province has been a source of conflict among many examples across the country. On a positive note, chiefs have a lot of influence over their subjects, therefore, they can be instrumental in resolving conflicts in the community. They can be used as peace ambassadors within their geographical areas of jurisdiction.

3.5.6 Civil Society Organizations
The study established that various civil society organizations are implementing programmes geared towards alleviating some of the structural factors identified in the study. However, it was noted that there are very few CSOs dealing with the issues of
conflict prevention and conflict management in the country. Furthermore, it was established that whereas previously CSOs where active in ensuring domestic accountability, peace consolidation and social cohesion, current civil society movement is largely fragmented, lacks cohesion and weak to effectively play its role in peace and social cohesion.

3.5.7 The Police
As the custodians of law and order, the police play a fundamental role in conflict prevention and management especially during election period. However as earlier alluded to, findings indicate that the police are increasingly deploying policing tactics which contribute to an escalation of conflict. Findings indicate that most police officers generally lack soft-power conflict management skills, and are excessive in the use of hard-power tactics which do not conform to modern techniques of electoral policing and crowd control including the selective application of the Public Order Act.

3.5.8. Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC)
While the role of Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) is critical in management electoral related corruption, findings indicate that the role of the ACC during elections is very passive. Respondents also show little knowledge of any collaboration between the ACC and other formal dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Police, and the judiciary.

3.5.9 Media
The media in Zambia is perceived as key actors in peace and social cohesion. The media is a key player in mobilizing people for peace. However, findings show that currently, the media is Zambia is slowly gravitating towards conflict insensitive journalism and does not provide an even landscape for all political actors. The public media has been singled out as main proponents of this.
SECTION FOUR: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Conclusion
The study has identified some structural causes of conflict such as regionalism and ethnic power politics, poverty and inequality, unemployment, militarization of party cadres, retrogressive culture and weak institutions. It has demonstrated that structural factors cross-pollinate with other factors thus leading to violent conflicts. Conflict prevention and management, therefore, are critical mechanism to deal with conflict issues in communities. In Zambia, this study has identified a broad menu of structural factors, triggers and conflict actors; the challenge for the medium- to long-terms is the need to develop deliberate policies and programmes that are geared towards addressing both the root cause and triggers to conflicts. The commissioning of this study by the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) is considered a step forward in providing more accurate and prevention-oriented analysis of causes and triggers of conflict. Given the potentially important roles civil society groups, churches, traditional leaders, local communities, local agencies, government and donors play in conflict prevention and conflict management architecture, ECZs task is to tap on the comparative advantage of these entities to assist in developing a robust conflict prevention and conflict management framework.

4.2 Recommendations
Specifically, the study recommends the following:

To the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ)
1. Capacity building of Conflict management Committees (CMCs) in their new mandate of conflict prevention. Development of indicator based grassroots early warning system as well as peace awareness activities should be considered going forward as this will strengthen the prevention aspect of CMCs work.
2. The Commission should set of a small panel of ‘Insider Mediators’ working within the framework of the NCMC. This should be a panel of eminent persons with gravitas. Using the good offices of the Chairperson of the Commission, working with the Chairperson of NCMC, the Insider Mediators can be
deployed for preventive diplomacy on critical electoral matters to build consensus. An example of this might be shuttle diplomacy by **Insider Mediators** to all political party presidents to build consensus on critical electoral matters before and after elections.

3. Political party liaison committee needs to be reactivated to play its role in building trust and confidence among stakeholders in electoral process. This forum has been identified as critical confidences building consensus on electoral matters among political parties. Furthermore, it will act as a confidence building mechanism as it enhances consultation and cooperation between the Electoral Commission and political parties on electoral matters. This will in tandem promote peace during elections.

4. Collaborative dialogues to enhance cohesion by all key stakeholders on electoral issues should be an on-going process. This should not only be done at national level, but also at district levels and can be within the framework of CMCs or party liaison committees.

5. Programmes on sensitization of political parties on their roles and duties in promoting peace and security are critical. The sensitization should specifically focus on party cadres, party youth wings and key office holders/opinion makers in these political parties. The ferrying of carders from one town to another and the militarization of carders should be regulated.

6. Sensitization of police officers on their role in conflict management especially in elections period is imperative. Strong collaboration between the police and ECZ will be critical in dealing with electoral related violence.

7. Hate speech and negative ethnicity should be punished. The Electoral Act can be instrumental in dissuading politicians from engaging in hate speech and negative ethnicity.

8. Electoral Reforms to address existing inconsistencies and other legal lacunas in the current Electoral Process Act should be considered as a means of peace building.
To the Government and other co-operating partners supporting the Commission

The following recommendations seek to promote social cohesion in Zambia and contribute to a credible electoral process. Support to these aspects contributes to the Commission strength in conducting credible elections in a free and peaceful environment.

1. Programs supporting institutionalization of political parties need to be established. The envisaged programs will support the transformation of political parties in terms of their organization and functions. Organized political parties will thus be the building block towards a peaceful society.

2. Programs geared towards promotion of national and social cohesion such as mainstreaming peace education in the Zambian curricular should be promoted. Encourage public dialogue for social exchange programs and peace education in schools. This will enhance the efficacy of grassroots conflict management and resolution. Civil society organizations, churches, traditional leaders, conflict management committees can be instrumental in championing this role.

3. There is need for continued implementation of sound fiscal policies with particular focus on vulnerable groups such as the youth and women. The fiscal policies should be extended to address the issue of marginalization. The implementation of fiscal policies should mainly focus on socio-economic vulnerability and should be spearheaded by the government and supported by donor partners. The implementation of fiscal policies will in the long run address structural issues related to poverty, marginalization and unemployment.

4. There is need for mainstreaming Security Sector Reforms (SSR) which should among other things review the application of the Public Order Act, the need for police to use modern methods of crowd control as opposed to live bullets and guns which only escalate the conflict.

5. As part of building national capacities for conflict prevention, there is need to seriously explore ways of building national infrastructures for peace by way of setting up a National Peace Architecture (NPA). This should be anchored on a sound National peace Policy.

6. Media reforms will be cardinal towards supporting a peaceful and an enabling electoral environment going forward. If not managed properly, the media can
trigger an escalation of conflict especially during an election period in a political landscape such as Zambia which has deep structural drivers of conflict. Priority areas in this aspect should focus on; (i) equal access to public media by all stakeholders (ii) ensuring balanced reporting and ;(iii) capacity-building in terms of ensuring conflict-sensitive Journalism/peace Journalism.

7. The role of Traditional Leaders in politics and national cohesion should be clearly spelt-out. As is stands, this is not clear in the new constitution. Going forward, Traditional Leaders role in partisan politics should be minimized while strengthening their role in social cohesion matters.

8. The role of CSOs in domestic accountability, oversight and peace consolidation cannot be overemphasized. Weak and fragmented CSOs cannot effectively play this role and exacerbates conflict. Programmes aimed at strengthening the CSOs in social cohesion need to be supported.

9. Strengthen human rights monitoring, including GBV issues during elections should be strengthened. This will allow for timely identification and management of human rights abuses that are increasingly becoming prevalent during election time. Ultimately, this will contribute to free, peaceful and credible elections. Synergies can be created with institutions such as the Human Rights Commission (HRC)

10. Programs addressing issues of gender dimensions of conflict during elections and rising cases of GBV especially in densely populated and poor compounds. The programs may include psycho-social services, counseling and reporting.

11. A key overall recommendation to co-operating partners and ECZ is to consider designing an integrated approach to the next election cycle project in order to deal with all these aspects strengthen collaboration of key actors and allow for a multi-stakeholder approach.
4.3. Implementation Matrix

The implementation matrix below proposes a framework of implementing all key recommendations. It highlights the recommended issue, means of implementation, target stakeholders, and expected impact.

Matrix of Recommendations and Implementation Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Recommended</th>
<th>Means of Implementation</th>
<th>Target Stakeholders</th>
<th>Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capacity building of Conflict management Committees (CMCs) in their new mandate of conflict prevention</td>
<td>Development of indicator based grassroots early warning system • Peace awareness activities</td>
<td>ECZ</td>
<td>CMCs are able to timely respond to, and effectively manage conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insider Mediation within the framework of the NCMC</td>
<td>Set-up a small panel of <strong>Insider Mediators</strong> for preventive/shuttle diplomacy to build consensus on critical electoral matters. This would support the work of good office of the Chairperson of the Commission as a preventive diplomacy tool.</td>
<td>ECZ</td>
<td>Enhanced Preventive Diplomacy by the office of the Chairperson of ECZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Liaison Committees</td>
<td>Strengthening the role of party Liaison Committees as confidence building mechanism</td>
<td>ECZ</td>
<td>Improved consensus building among political parties; as well as between political parties and the Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building capacities of political parties in Conflict Management</td>
<td>Training of political parties in conflict management • Awareness activities to political parties on peace and social cohesion matters</td>
<td>ECZ • Political Parties • Insider Mediators</td>
<td>Respectful politics among political parties enhanced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Building capacities of Police in conflict management | • Training of Police in Conflict Management  
• Sensitisation activities to police on peace and social cohesion matters  
• Deployment of Insider Mediators for shuttle diplomacy to high police Command | • ECZ  
• Police  
• Insider Mediators  
• Top Police Command  
• Clergy | • Improved collaboration by Police and ECZ in conflict prevention |
| Hate speech before, during after campaigns | • Electoral Process Act to make punishable the use of hate speech before, during and after campaigns | • ECZ  
• Politicians | • Respectful politics among key political players |
| Electoral Reforms | • Review of the Electoral Process Act  
• Political Parties  
• CSOs | • ECZ  
• Political Parties  
• CSOs | • Existing inconsistencies and other legal lacunas in the current Electoral Process Act addressed |

### Recommendations to the Government and Co-operating Partners

| Institutionalizing Political Parties | • Programs for supporting transformation of political parties in terms organization and functions. This improves intra-party democracy, and effectiveness in their work hence, promotes peace. | • Political Parties | • Intra-party democracy enhanced  
• Well organised political parties as agents of peace |
| Peace Education for social cohesion | • Mainstreaming peace education in schools  
• Mainstreaming peace education in churches | • Schools  
• Ministry of Education  
• Churches | • Consolidation of peace and social cohesion in the Country  
• Elections conducted in... |
| Security Sector Reforms (SSR) | • Strengthen conflict management in police training – **the soft power aspects**  
• Police to be re-trained in effective electoral policing and modern crowd control strategies – **both soft power & hard power strategies**  
• Increase police, ACC, DEC, ECZ and Immigration collaboration in policing elections | • Police  
• ECZ  
• Human Rights Commission  
• Co-operating partners supporting SSR | • Improved electoral policing which contributes to peace and security  
• Improved collaboration between Police, other law enforcement agencies and ECZ during elections |
| Building National Infrastructure for Peace (IfP) for dealing with all types of conflict, including emerging security threats. (Highlighted because it’s the key and most sustainable) | • Formulation of a National Peace Policy  
• Develop a National Peace Architecture within the framework of the National Peace Policy as a framework for promoting sustainable and pro-active conflict management and | • Government of Zambia (Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Office of the president, Cabinet) | • Collaborative framework for consolidation of peace and social cohesion in Zambia  
• A Sustainable pro-active national peace architecture to deal with all types of conflict vulnerabilities in place and other |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy going forward)</th>
<th>Peace-building efforts.</th>
<th>Co-operating partners supporting social cohesion issues such as UNDP, USAID, EU, GIZ among others</th>
<th>Emerging security threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Media Reforms           | Capacity Building towards;  
  - Providing a balanced media coverage especially during elections  
  - Equal access to media by all key stakeholders  
  - Conflict sensitive reporting/peace Journalism  | Media Houses  
  Media co-coordinating bodies | An improved media landscape contributing to peace and social cohesion in the country  
  - A media which becomes an incentive for peace during elections  
  - Improved collaboration between ECZ and Media in ensuring an enabling environment for peaceful and credible elections |
| Role of Traditional Leaders in Peace and Social Cohesion | Training of Traditional Leaders in conflict management  
  - Awareness activities to Traditional leaders on peace and social cohesion matters  
  - Deployment of Insider Mediators for shuttle | Traditional Leaders  
  Ministry of Traditional Affaires  
  House of Chiefs  
  National Museums Board  
  National Heritage Commission | Enhanced National peace and Social Cohesion  
  - Improved collaboration between ECZ and Traditional Leaders in Conflict management and elections |
| **Strengthening the role of CSOs in Peace and Social Cohesion** | • Programmes aimed at strengthening among CSO actors  
• Mentorship programmes for CSO Leaders and aspiring CSO leaders  
• Training of CSOs in conflict sensitive programming and Conflict management | • CSOs  
• ECZ | • CSOs effectively mainstreaming conflict sensitive programming  
• CSOs as effective peace-builders and part of the insider mediation process  
• Strengthened oversight role by CSOs  
• Contributed to effective domestic accountability  
• Improved collaboration between CSOs and ECZ in conflict management |
| **Human Rights Monitoring during elections** | • Strengthen Human Rights Monitoring for timely identification and management of Human rights abuses during elections | • Human Rights Commission  
• Police  
• ECZ | • Timely identification and effective management of human rights abuses during elections. This builds confidence among key |
Addressing gender dimensions of conflict during elections
• Mainstreaming gender in conflict management and political party processes during elections

• Ministry of Gender
• UNWOMEN
• Women’s Movement
• Political Parties
• ECZ

• Gender issues will be mainstreamed in the electoral process.

*A key overall recommendation to co-operating partners and ECZ is to consider designing an integrated approach to the next election cycle project in order to deal with cohesion aspects among key stakeholders, strengthen collaboration of key actors and allow for a multi-stakeholder approach to elections.*
## Appendix 1: SUMMARY OF KEY STRUCTURAL, ACTORS AND TRIGGERS OF CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region/Province</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Conflict factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern, Luapula and Muchinga</td>
<td>Kasama, Mfulungu, Chipili, Nchelenge, and Mansa</td>
<td><strong>Structural</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Unemployment&lt;br&gt;- Poverty&lt;br&gt;- Marginalization&lt;br&gt;- Negative Ethnicity and political supremacy battles&lt;br&gt;- Chiefdom rivalry&lt;br&gt;- Chiefdom boundary delineation&lt;br&gt;- Militarization of party cadres&lt;br&gt;- Retrogressive cultural attitudes and stereotypes&lt;br&gt;- Weak institutions (political parties, CSOs and government)&lt;br&gt;- Historical injustices that relate to political and economic exclusion&lt;br&gt;- Illiteracy</td>
<td><strong>Primary</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Youth&lt;br&gt;- Young women especially in Chipili district in Chibalashi ward&lt;br&gt;- Party cadres&lt;br&gt;- Police&lt;br&gt;- Media&lt;br&gt;- Political parties&lt;br&gt;- ECZ&lt;br&gt;- Traditional leaders (Chiefs)&lt;br&gt;- Conflict Management Committees&lt;br&gt;- Party liaison committees&lt;br&gt;- Local politicians (MPs)&lt;br&gt;- Local authorities&lt;br&gt;- Biased application of the Public Order Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Triggers</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Biased application of the Public Order Act</td>
<td><strong>Secondary</strong>&lt;br&gt;- Faith based organization&lt;br&gt;- CSOs&lt;br&gt;- Law Association of Zambia&lt;br&gt;- The Judiciary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Use of government resources during campaigns
- Ferrying of party cadres from one region to another
- Hate speech
- Conflict insensitive media
- Political campaigns
- Intra-party nominations
- Lack of intra party democracy
- Political victimization and profiling
- Elections
- Lack of awareness of existing laws especially the code of conduct
- Use of drugs especially alcohol
- Inter-ethnic/regional political rivalry

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Region/Province</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Conflict factors</th>
<th>Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central, Copperbelt, Eastern, North-Western</td>
<td>Solwezi, Chadiza, Luanshya, Katete, Kabwe, Itezhi-Tezhi, and Mufumbwe</td>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Illiteracy</td>
<td>- Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ethnicity/regionalism</td>
<td>- Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Poverty</td>
<td>- Party cadres</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Traditional leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Conflict management Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Politicians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak institutions especially political parties</td>
<td>Pastors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural issue that relate to chieftaincy</td>
<td>University students</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Boundaries issues</td>
<td>ECZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Militarization of party cadres</td>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>Political Liaison committees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Political patronage</td>
<td>Business men/women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Access/ skewed justice system</td>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural stereotype</td>
<td>Media</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Trigger**

- Hate speech
- Electoral related issues
- Alcohol and substance abuse mainly by party cadres
- Political party primaries
- Selective application of the Public Order Act
- Miss use of government resources especially during campaigns
- Politicization of relief food distribution
- Distraction of campaign materials
- Party adoption
- Voter buying and bribery
- Pastors
- University students
- ECZ
- Political parties
- Political Liaison committees
- Business men/women
- Media
- Churches
- Civil society organizations
- Donors
- Civil servants
- Law society of Zambia
- Courts

| Pastors |
| University students |
| ECZ |
| Political parties |
| Political Liaison committees |
| Business men/women |

**Secondary**

- Media
- Churches
- Civil society organizations
- Donors
- Civil servants
- Law society of Zambia
- Courts
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Structural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Marginalization – road network poor</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Unemployment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Cultural undertones (Dudumwezi)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Nepotism</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Political intolerance</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Historical issues (Baroze land issue)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- Chiefdom rivalry (chief Macha and Chief Chikanta; Sinazongwe and Mwempa)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Militarization of cadres especially in Monze</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Corruption</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Inequality (resource distribution)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Poverty</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

|                |           | Primary          |        |
|                 |           | - Youth          |        |
|                 |           | - Party cadres   |        |
|                 |           | - Chiefs         |        |
|                 |           | - Police         |        |
|                 |           | - Political parties |    |
|                 |           | - District conflict management committees |    |
|                 |           | - ECZ            |        |
|                 |           | - Local politicians |    |
|                 |           | - Media          |        |

<p>|                |           | Secondary        |        |
|                 |           | - Churches, pastors |    |
|                 |           | - CSOs           |        |
|                 |           | - Government institutions |    |
|                 |           | - Courts         |        |
|                 |           | - Law society of Zambia |    |
|                 |           | - Political party liaison committees |    |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trigger</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Illiteracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Weak institutions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Chief participating actively in politics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Selective application of the public order Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Chiefs actively involving themselves in politics</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Ferrying of cadres</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Perception of police biasness</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Unequal media coverage</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Intolerance and not obeying the electoral code of conduct</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Misinterpretation of the law by law enforcement agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Abuse of authority by the police</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Imposing issues on the community with consultation</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Public servants being partisan in politics</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Polling officials being biased</td>
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</tbody>
</table>